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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENTS AND TRADE SECRET LITIGATION IN
MINNESOTA: THE EVOLUTION OF TRADE SECRET
LAW FROM CHERNE TO ELECTRO- CRAFT
PATRICK GARRYt
Employment agreements have a significant impact on trade secret ltiga-
tion. Minnesota common law provides two causes of action for employers
seeking to protect trade secrets.- breach of contract and tort misappropria-
tion. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, enacted in Minnesota in 1980, now
provides employers with an independent tort cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation. This Article examines the evolution of trade secret case
law in Minnesota, the efect of the Uniform Act, and the recent decision of
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled
Motion, Inc. It concludes that properly drafted employment agreements
are essential for an employer to protect confidential information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Protection of trade secrets has become increasingly important to
employers, especially those involved in high technology manufac-
turing. To prevent disclosure of trade secrets, employers often re-
quire their employees to sign restrictive employment agreements.
These agreements frequently contain non-competition clauses,
confidentiality clauses, or both. Generally, Minnesota courts look
t Member, Minnesota Bar. Mr. Garry received his B.A. in Economics in 1978 from
St. John's University, his M.A. in Economics in 1980, and his J.D. in 1983 from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota. He is currently an associate with the law firm of Doherty, Rumble
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with disfavor on restrictive covenants in employment contracts be-
cause such covenants operate as a restraint of trade.' To be en-
forceable, the agreements must be reasonable in time and
geographic area and must protect a legitimate interest of the em-
ployer.2 The protection of trade secrets or confidential informa-
tion constitutes one such legitimate interest. 3 If an employee
breaks a restrictive employment agreement protecting trade
secrets, the employer can sue the employee on the contract.
The employer, however, does not need a signed agreement in
order to protect trade secrets. A common law tort remedy for-
merly was available in Minnesota,4 and the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (Uniform Act) now provides employers with an in-
dependent action in tort for trade secret misappropriation. 5 Given
the substantial number of patents that are invalidated by the
courts, 6 many businesses now elect to protect commercially valua-
ble information by relying on the state laws protecting trade
1. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 332 (Minn. 1980). In
discussing both covenants not to compete and covenants not to use or disclose confidential
information, the Kirkevoldcourt stated that "generally, as these covenants not to compete
tend to operate as a restraint of trade and have substantial harmful effects, they are to be
carefully scrutinized .... " Id, see also Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1029,
1031 (D. Minn. 1982) ("Minnesota courts look with disfavor on restrictive covenants in
employment contracts because they operate as a restraint of trade"). See generally Note,
Employment Contracts.- Covenants Not to Compete tn Minnesota, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 388
(1984).
2. Ki kevold 87 F.R.D. at 332. The Kirkevold court set forth the following test for
upholding restrictive covenants not to compete: "The test applied is whether or not the
restraint is necessary for the protection of the business or good will of the employer, and if
so, whether the stipulation has imposed upon the employee any greater restraint than is
reasonably necessary to protect the employer's business ....... Id (quoting Bennett v.
Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (1965)); see also Med-
tronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 527 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1981) (restrictive covenant narrowly
construed); Walker Employment Serv., Inc. v. Parkhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 219 N.W.2d 437
(1974) (restrictive covenant enforceable if not unreasonable in terms of area or time).
3. See Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1978). The
Modem Controls court recognized that protection of trade secrets is a legitimate interest
underlying restrictive employment agreements. The court further reasoned that even
"confidential business information which does not rise to the level of a trade secret can be
protected by a properly drawn ,covenant not to compete." Id. at 1268.
4. In Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979),
the Minnesota Supreme Court defined the common law cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation. Id at 90. Cherne was decided prior to Minnesota's adoption of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act. See imft a notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
5. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1982); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 541
(1979).
6. See Wetzel, A Survey of Patent juy Litigation for the Last Fifteen Years, 10 INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 377, 378 (1978).
[Vol. 11
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secrets. 7
In Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc.,8 the Minnesota
Supreme Court decided its first case under the Uniform Act. 9 The
court considered the issue of whether employment agreements al-
low an employer to bring a tort cause of action for misappropria-
tion under the Uniform Act. A crucial issue was whether a signed
employment agreement could impose a special duty of confidenti-
ality and non-competition upon a former employee, 10 and whether
that agreement created a trade secret where none had previously
existed. " In several cases preceding Electro-Craft, Minnesota courts
have granted injunctions to prevent former employees from com-
peting with their employers. 12 Each case involved employment
agreements. 13 In Electro-Craft, however, the court denied injunc-
tive relief to the plaintiff/employer even though the employer had
obtained a signed employment agreement from the defendant, a
former employee. 14 Electro-Craft is an important decision not only
because it is the first Minnesota Supreme Court interpretation of
the Uniform Act, but also because it sheds additional light on the
role of employment agreements in trade secret litigation.
This Article reviews the role that employment agreements play
in trade secret litigation. It examines the effect of those agree-
ments on an employer's cause of action for trade secret misappro-
priation against a former employee. Recent developments in
Minnesota trade secret law suggest that employment agreements,
especially those containing non-competition clauses, provide more
effective protection for an employer's "confidential information"
than does reliance solely upon the state trade secret protection
laws. After an examination of recent case law dealing with em-
7. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). Kewanee Oilestablishes
that neither the patent clause of the United States Constitution nor the federal patent
laws preempt state trade secret protection for patentable or unpatentable information. See
id. This case may well have increased the extent of employers' reliance on state law.
8. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
9. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1982). For a discussion of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, see izfra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
10. 332 N.W.2d at 901.
11. Id. at 903.
12. See Modem Controls, 578 F.2d at 1270; Kiikevold, 87 F.R.D. at 339; Cheme, 278
N.W.2d at 93.
13. The employment agreements typically contained agreements not to disclose confi-
dential information and covenants not to compete. See 578 F.2d at 1266; 87 F.R.D. at 328;
278 N.W.2d at 86.
14. 332 N.W.2d at 904. The employment agreement, however, did not contain a
covenant not to compete. ld at 895.
19851
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ployment agreements in trade secret litigation, this author con-
cludes that, even if unenforceable in a breach of contract action,
employment agreements may still create a cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation.
II. THE COMMON LAW OF TRADE SECRETS IN MINNESOTA
The Electro-Craft case and the Uniform Act are not a sharp de-
parture from past common law.' 5 They reflect the latest steps in
the evolution of trade secret law in Minnesota. Prior to the Act, a
handful of cases constituted the common law of trade secret misap-
propriation in Minnesota. Those cases reveal the close interplay
between employment agreements and trade secret litigation in
Minnesota.
The recent evolution of trade secret law in Minnesota began
with the case of Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates. 16 In
Cherne, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an employer's list
of customers is confidential information and prohibited some for-
mer employees from using such lists.' 7 The employer, Cherne In-
dustrial, developed and marketed operations and maintenance
manuals for newly constructed sewage treatment plants. Cherne
policy required key employees to sign an employment agreement
prohibiting the use or disclosure of any confidential information
and restricting their right to compete with Cherne for two years
following termination of employment.,, Each of the defendants
signed such an agreement. When the defendants left Cherne's em-
ploy they took certain information used in Cherne's operations
and maintenance manual business. Cherne brought an action to
enjoin the defendants from using the information and from com-
peting with the company in the marketing and production of oper-
ations and maintenance manuals. 19
15. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 538
(1979) (hereinafter cited as Commissioner's Prefatory Note]. The Uniform Act codifies the
basic rules of the common law of trade secrets. Id
16. 278 N.W.2d 81.
17. See Modem Controls, 578 F.2d at 1264; Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. at 324. These cases rest
upon a breach of contract theory rather than on a tort cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation. In these cases, the plaintiff/employer sued former employees to enforce
a restrictive employment covenant signed by the employees. 578 F.2d at 1266; 87 F.R.D.
at 326.
18. See Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982);
Electro-Craty, 332 N.W.2d 890.
19. Cheme, 278 N.W.2d at 91, 93. Over a number of years, Cherne had compiled a list
of consulting engineers who were customers or prospective customers for Cherne's product.
[Vol. I I
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The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the injunction granted
to Cherne by the trial court.20 While the trial court had granted
its injunction for the defendants' violation of the covenant not to
compete, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the propriety of
the injunction in terms of whether the defendants had violated
their duty not to use or disclose confidential information obtained
from their employer. 21 To determine whether the defendants had
wrongfully used Cherne's confidential information, the court first
decided whether the customer lists amounted to a trade secret or
confidential information. 22 The Cherne court established a four-
part test for determining whether information constitutes a trade
secret or confidential information: (1) the protected matter is not
generally known or readily ascertainable; (2) the information pro-
vides a demonstrable competitive advantage; (3) the information
was gained at the expense of the employer; and (4) the information
is such that the employer intended to keep it confidential.
23
When employees of Cherne left to start their own business and took the customer list with
them, Cherne sued to enjoin them from using that information. Id at 86-87.
20. The employment agreement signed by the individual defendants provided in
part:
FOR a period of two years after termination of my employment by 'C'.
a) If I have been or am employed by 'C' in a sales capacity, I will not
render services, directly or indirectly, to any CONFLICTING ORGANIZA-
TION in connection with sale, merchandising or promotion of CONFLICTING
PRODUCTS to any customer of 'C' upon whom I called, or whose account I
supervised on behalf of 'C' at any time during the last two years of my employ-
ment by 'C'.
b) If I have been or am employed by 'C' in a non-sales capacity, I will not
render services to any manufacturer or merchandiser of a product which com-
petes in the sales market with a 'C' product.
Id at 88.
In addition to this covenant not to compete, Cherne also had its employees sign an
agreement prohibiting them from using or disclosing any confidential information and
from taking such information from Cherne upon termination of employment. The con-
tract defined "confidential information" as: "Information not generally known, about 'C'
processes and products, including information relating to research, development, manu-
facture, purchasing, accounting, engineering, marketing, merchandising and selling." Id.
at 89.
21. Cherne's claim asserted two theories of relief against the defendants. First,
Cherne contended that the defendants had breached the covenant not to compete con-
tained in the employment agreement. Id at 88. Second, the company argued that the
defendants had taken and used confidential data and trade secrets belonging to Cherne.
Id at 89-90.
22. Id at 92. The trial court's injunction was based on its finding that the defendants
had breached their employment agreements with Cherne by taking and using confidential
information belonging to Cherne. For a more extensive discussion of a former employee's
duty not to use or disclose customer lists, see Annot., 28 A.L.R. 3d 7 (1969).
23. The court recognized that a trial court could grant an injunction against a de-
fendant who has, in violation of either an express agreement or a common law duty,
1985]
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The Cherne court found that the information taken by the de-
fendants constituted confidential information and that the defend-
ants had breached their employment agreements by wrongfully
taking and using the information. 24 The court also recognized
that an injunction may be granted against a party who has wrong-
fully used confidential information or trade secrets obtained from
his employer, even in the absence of a confidentiality agreement. 25
Thus, the court implied that information which fits the Cherne defi-
nition of trade secrets or confidential information can be protected
either by a tort action for disclosure of confidential information or
by a breach of contract action if a valid employment agreement
exists.
Cheme gave rise to two branches of trade secret cases. One uses
the Cheme definition of trade secrets to determine whether an em-
ployer's restrictive employment agreement is justified by a legiti-
mate interest in trade secret protection.26 This group of cases uses
the definition of a trade secret in the context of breach of contract
actions. The second branch of cases uses the Cherne trade secrets
definition to determine whether the employer has established a
tort cause of action for trade secret misappropriation in the ab-
sence of an employment agreement.2 7 While the remedy in both
wrongfully used confidential information or trade secrets obtained from his or her em-
ployer. 278 N.W.2d at 92; see also Equipment Advertiser, Inc. v. Harris, 271 Minn. 451,
136 N.W.2d 302 (1965) (sustaining trial court's injunction against defendants for violating
a common law duty not to copy lists of former employer). The court stated that even in
the absence of an express employment agreement, an employee has a common law duty
not to disclose either trade secrets or confidential information. 278 N.W.2d at 92 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958)).
24. The court found it necessary to first define two central concepts: confidential
information and trade secret. While confidential information was defined in the employ-
ment agreement, the term "trade secret," according to the court, has "no universally rec-
ognized definition." 278 N.W.2d at 89.
25. Id. at 90. The court referred to previous judicial definitions of confidential infor-
mation and quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of trade secrets. The
court stated that "certain common elements can be distilled from these definitions and
fashioned into a workable test encompassing both concepts." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 (1977)).
26. 278 N.W.2d at 90-91. The court issued the injunction on the basis of breach of
the covenant not to disclose confidential information, not on the basis of a breach of the
covenant not to compete. Accordingly, the court stated: "Since we have determined that
the injunction in this case could be issued as a remedy for a breach of the duty not to use
confidential information, we need not decide whether this injunction could be issued as a
remedy for the breach of the covenant not to compete." Id. at 93.
27. Id. at 92. The court also stated that an injunction may be granted against a party
who has, in violation of either an explicit agreement or a common law duty, wrongfully
used confidential information or trade secrets. Id. Both trade secrets and confidential
[Vol. 11
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lines of cases is the same-the issuance of an injunction-the bur-
den of proving the existence of a trade secret is greater in cases
involving misappropriation.
A. The Breach of Employment Agreement Analysis
Minnesota Mi'ning & Manufacturing Co. v. Kirkevo/d 28 provides the
framework for analyzing breach of employment agreement cases
in Minnesota. In Kirkevold, the United States District Court for
Minnesota granted an injunction restraining a former employee
from competing with his former employer, Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company (3M).29 The court found that 3M had
information are subject to the same common law duty not to disclose. Id; see also Equbp-
ment Advertiser, Inc., 271 Minn. 451, 136 N.W.2d 302.
For a discussion of cases considering an employee's duty, in the absence of an express
contract, not to use or disclose trade secrets or confidential information belonging to a
former employer, see Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 631 (1970). Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 396 (1977) states that after termination of the agency the agent has a duty not to use or
disclose trade secrets or confidential information given to the agent only for the principal's
use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1977).
28. 87 F.R.D. at 324. The plaintiff, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M),
was engaged in the manufacturing and worldwide marketing of magnetic media. This
included various forms of information storage devices used in the operation of computers.
Id. at 326-27. The various categories of magnetic media products manufactured by 3M
are comprised of magnetic tape, flexible discs, and rigid discs. These products can store
information after the information is magnetically recorded. Id The court recognized that
the magnetic media industry is a competitive and rapidly changing technological field. Id
29. Id. at 339. In its decision, the court applied Minnesota law. Minnesota law was
used to determine whether the plaintiff had established a probability of success on the
merits so as to justify the issuance of an injunction. Id. at 330-32.
Defendant Kirkevold was a chemist employed by 3M in its manufacturing and mar-
keting of magnetic media. See id. at 327-28. When he was hired by 3M, Kirkevold signed
an employment agreement containing a covenant not to disclose confidential information
and a covenant not to compete. Id. at 328. The pertinent provisions of the 3M-Kirkevold
employment agreement provided as follows:
B. EXCEPT as required in my duties to 3M, I will never use or disclose
any CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. ...
E. For a period of two years after termination of my employment by
3M ...
b. If I have been or am employed by 3M in a non-sales capacity, I will not
render services, directly or indirectly, to any CONFLICTING ORGANIZA-
TION, except that I may accept employment with a CONFLICTING ORGAN-
IZATION whose business is diversified, and which as to part of its business is not
a CONFLICTING ORGANIZATION, provided 3M, prior to my accepting
such employment, shall receive separate written assurances satisfactory to 3M
from such CONFLICTING ORGANIZATION and from me, that I will not
render services directly or indirectly in connection with any CONFLICTING
PRODUCT.
If I am unable to obtain employment consistent with my training and education,
solely because of provisions of this paragraph E, such provisions shall bind me
only as long as 3M shall make payments to me equal to my monthly base pay at
19851
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established, with a probability of success, that the employment
agreement was reasonable and hence enforceable.30 This reasona-
bleness determination was based upon the Cheme test for confiden-
tial information, since a reasonable restrictive agreement must
serve a legitimate interest of the employer, such as the protection
of trade secrets.
3'
The Kirkevold court first analyzed the enforceability of the cove-
nant not to compete. 32 The test for such agreements is whether the
agreement is reasonable and necessary for the protection of a legit-
imate business interest of the employer. 33 In upholding the cove-
nant not to compete, the court found that the covenant was
necessary to protect confidential information, that the information
was confidential under the Cherne test, and that the employee had
access to the confidential information.
34
termination (exclusive of extra compensation or employee benefits) for each
month of such unemployment.
Id. at 328-29.
The covenant not to render services to any competing organization for a two-year
period after leaving the employment of 3M was the critical provision at issue and the one
which 3M sought to enforce against Kirkevold. Id. at 329.
When Kirkevold went to work for a competing company, 3M sought a preliminary
injunction against him. Id at 326. After Kirkevold left his employment at 3M, he began
working for Verbatim Corporation as a senior staff chemist. Id at 327. Verbatim was a
competitor of 3M in the manufacturing and marketing of magnetic media. Id At the
time of suit, Verbatim was a leader in the flexible disc area of the industry. Verbatim and
3M were both in the process of developing a rigid disc product. Id. at 328. Verbatim
hired Kirkevold to assist in the development of its rigid disc. Id at 327. After Kirkevold
went to work for Verbatim, 3M sought to enforce the covenant not to compete against
Kirkevold. Id. at 329.
30. The employment agreement referred to by the court had been signed by defend-
ant Kirkevold when he began working for 3M. The agreement contained both a covenant
not to disclose confidential information and a covenant not to compete. Id at 328.
31. In Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899
(1965), the court established the rule that covenants not to compete must be reasonably
necessary to protect the business or goodwill of an employer. Since the protection of trade
secrets is necessary for the protection of the employer's business, the reasonableness of a
covenant not to compete depends on whether trade secrets actually existed. Modem Con-
trols, 578 F.2d at 1268. To determine the existence of trade secrets, the Kirkevoldcourt used
the Cherne four-part test. 87 F.R.D. at 334.
32. 87 F.R.D. at 332-34. Since the plaintiff did not establish a breach of the covenant
not to disclose confidential information, the court focused only on the enforceability of the
covenant not to compete. Id. at 332 n.2.
33. Id. at 332. Such covenants tend to restrain trade and have substantial harmful
side effects, so the courts carefully scrutinize them. Id.; see, e.g., Cherne, 278 N.W.2d 81;
Walker Employment Sem., 300 Minn. 264, 219 N.W.2d 437; Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v.
West, 281 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968); Store Broadcasthg Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134
N.W.2d 892.
34. 87 F.R.D. at 335. The first step the Kirkevoldcourt used in determining the en-
forceability of the non-competition covenant was to assess whether the employee had ac-
[Vol. I11
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Applying the Cherne test, the Kirkevoldcourt found that the infor-
mation 3M sought to protect by the employment agreement was
indeed confidential and protectable. 35 The court's examination of
the information's trade secret status, however, was aimed at deter-
mining whether the employment agreement was reasonable. The
court did not examine whether 3M had a probability of success on
the merits of a trade secret misappropriation cause of action. 36 In
effect, this case emphasized the distinction implied in Cherne be-
tween the tort action and the breach of contract action.
Additionally, the Kirkevoldcourt set a lower standard of proof for
what constitutes a trade secret in the context of employment
agreements. "An employer need only show that an employee had
access to confidential information and a court will then determine
the overall reasonableness of the covenant in light of the interest
sought to be protected. ' 37 This standard is lower than the burden
of proof necessary to prove the existence of a trade secret in a mis-
appropriation cause of action.38  Consequently, employment
cess to confidential information. Id at 333; see also Modern Controls, 578 F.2d at 1268. The
court then used the Cherne test to determine whether the information concerned was in-
deed confidential, triggering a restrictive covenant. 87 F.R.D. at 334.
35. 87 F.R.D. at 335. The court noted that protectability is dependent on the first
two Cheme elements: "(1) the protected matter is not generally known or readily ascertain-
able, [and] (2) it provides a demonstrable competitive advantage." Id at 334. The court
found that 3M's material satisfied both elements. Id. at 334-35.
36. The court's determination of the probability of success on the merits focused on
the reasonableness of the covenant not to compete. See id at 334-37.
37. Id at 333 (quoting Modem Controls, 578 F.2d at 1268). In finding that the cove-
nant not to compete was aimed at protecting trade secrets, the court first had to determine
that a trade secret existed. The court used the Cheme test for making such a determina-
tion. In so doing, however, the court recognized that "[tlo require an employer to prove
the existence of trade secrets prior to enforcement of a covenant not to compete may
defeat the only purpose for which the covenant exists." Id. Thus, the court did not re-
quire that the plaintiff, before obtaining an injunction, strictly prove the existence of a
trade secret.
38. This differential standard reflects a prior holding by the Eighth Circuit, interpret-
ing Minnesota law, that "confidential business information which does not rise to the level
of a trade secret can be protected by a properly drawn covenant not to compete." Modern
Controls, 578 F.2d at 1268.
The Kkevold court, after quoting at length from Modem Controls, stated, "In the pres-
ent context, as in Modem Controls, the reasonableness of the covenant not to compete con-
tained in the 3M-Kirkevold employment agreement is premised on 3M's need to protect
against the possible disclosure of its trade secrets or confidential information." 87 F.R.D.
at 334. The Kirkevold court also held that given Kirkevold's knowledge of and access to
3M's confidential information, the decision in Modem Controls mandated a finding that the
3M-Kirkevold covenant not to compete is reasonable for the protection of 3M's confiden-
tial information. Id at 335.
Modern Controls involved a covenant not to compete similar to the one in Kirkevold 578
F.2d at 1266. The covenant specified that Andreadakis would not work for a competitor
19851
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agreements can be used to protect an employer's confidential in-
of Modern Controls for a two-year period following his termination of employment with
Modern Controls. Id The court of appeals granted a preliminary injunction after finding
that Modern Controls had established the reasonableness and enforceability of its cove-
nant not to compete. Id. at 1270-71. The court premised its issuance of an injunction on
its findings that Modern Controls had shown with a probability of success on the merits
that the covenant was reasonable and enforceable. Id at 1267-70. According to the
Eighth Circuit test, an injunction will be granted only if the moving party shows a
probability of success on the merits and if irreparable injury will be suffered if the injunc-
tion is denied. Id at 1267 (quoting Fennell v. Butler, 570 F.2d 263, 264 (8th Cir. 1978)).
In holding that Modern Controls had established the existence of its confidential in-
formation, the court recognized that confidential business information which does not rise
to trade secret status can nonetheless be protected by a covenant not to compete. Id. 1268
An employer need only show that an employee had access to confidential information.
The court will then determine the overall reasonableness of the covenant in light of the
employer's interest sought to be protected. Id. (citing Eutectzic Weldng Alloys Corp., 281
Minn. at 18-20, 160 N.W.2d at 570-71). The court recognized that "[t]o require an em-
ployer to prove the existence of trade secrets prior to enforcement of a covenant not to
compete may defeat the only purpose for which the covenant exists." Id. Modern Con-
trols proved by affidavit that Andreadakis had access to confidential information. Id at
1269. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 667-74
(1960) (discussing interchangeably "trade secret" and "confidential business information"
as related to covenants not to compete).
In Kirkevold, as in Modem Controls, the court upheld the reasonableness of the covenant
not to compete. The court found that the covenant was premised on the employer's legiti-
mate need to prevent possible disclosure of its trade secrets or confidential information.
This finding was based upon the court's use of the Cherne four-part test to determine that
the information to which defendant had access probably constituted trade secrets or confi-
dential information. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. at 338. According to the court in Modem Controls,
a lower burden of proof applies to information which is subject to an employment agree-
ment than to information which must be proved to be a trade secret in a plaintiff's cause
of action for trade secret misappropriation. 578 F.2d at 1268. Thus, a covenant not to
compete can protect information which does not rise to the level of trade secret, whereas a
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation requires first that the plaintiff strictly
prove the existence of a trade secret. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
In Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Minn. 1982), the court up-
held the enforceability of a non-competition clause contained in an employment contract.
Id at 1032. The employment agreement included the following provisions:
The Employee agrees that . . . he will not become an officer, director or stock-
holder of a corporation, nor a member of a partnership, nor a trustee of a busi-
ness trust, nor a participant in joint venture which conducts a Competing
Business, nor the proprietor of a Competing Business, nor an employee of such a
corporation, partnership, trust, joint venture or Competing Business.
Id. at 1031.
The Roth court's decision rested on the reasonableness of the restrictive covenant.
Reasonableness depends on whether the covenant upholds a legitimate interest of the em-
ployer. Id at 1032. The court stated that the employer has a legitimate business interest
in protecting confidential business information from disclosure. According to the court,
an employer may protect two types of legitimate interests through a restrictive covenant.
The first interest is trade secrets or confidential information; the second is the employer's
goodwill. Id at 1031. In holding that the covenant was reasonable, the court applied the
Modem Controls and Kirkevold test. First, the court found that the covenant did serve the
employer's interest in protecting certain confidential information from disclosure. Id at
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formation which does not rise to the level of a trade secret under
the definition in the Uniform Act. Though the information sought
to be protected must constitute confidential information, it need
not meet the strict test of trade secrets.
B. The Tort Cause of Action for Trade Secret Misappropriation
Analyszs
The second line of post-Cherne cases involves the availability of a
misappropriation cause of action for protection of an employer's
trade secrets. Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems 39 dealt exclu-
sively with a trade secret misappropriation cause of action.
40
Plaintiff Jostens, a manufacturer of school products, sued several
former employees and their current employer for misappropriation
of trade secrets used in the design and manufacture of class ring
molds. 4' Jostens claimed that its three computer subsystems,
which comprised its computerized mold-making manufacturing
system, constituted trade secrets.42 The Jostens court adopted a
1032. Second, the court found that the defendant had access to the confidential informa-
tion. Id The court found that Roth, as chief executive officer, had access to confidential
company information and policies. The court noted that enforcing the restrictive cove-
nant against Roth, an employee "at the highest levels of the company," would not lead to
the "form of industrial peonage" criticized in other previous cases. Id.
39. 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
40. jostens was not decided under the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MINN.
STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1982), because the Act was enacted after the cause of action arose.
Although Cherne recognized a common law duty not to disclose confidential informa-
tion, the case was decided on a breach of contract theory. See supra notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text. In jostens, the court decided the case solely on a misappropriation theory.
318 N.W.2d at 701-04. Such a result was necessary because the court had declared the
employment agreement invalid. Id at 703.
Jostens involved the application of the trade secret doctrine of Cherne to the rapidly
expanding and highly complex field of computer technology. Id at 698-701. For a discus-
sion of cases analyzing the circumstances under which the use or disclosure of computer
application software constitutes the misappropriation of a trade secret, see Annot., 30
A.L.R.4th 1250 (1984).
41. 318 N.W.2d at 694.
42. Id at 697. The former employees had signed a confidentiality agreement when
hired by Jostens acknowledging that all papers prepared by the employees were the prop-
erty of Jostens and that the employees would not disclose any information concerning
Jostens' business. Id at 695. The defendant-employees each signed the following
agreement:
All papers and apparatus relating to Jostens' business, including those prepared
or made by me, shall be the property of Jostens and except as required by my
work, I will not reveal them to others nor will I reveal any information concern-
ing Jostens' business including its inventions, shop practices, processes and meth-
ods of manufacturing and merchandising.
Id. at 703. The court, however, declared this agreement unenforceable for lack of consid-
eration. Id. at 703-04. The court found that the defendants signed the agreements after
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three-prong test for determining a cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation. 43 First, a trade secret must exist. In making
this determination, the court used the Cherne four-part test.44 Sec-
ond, the defendant must have acquired the trade secret as a result
of a confidential relationship.45 Third, the defendant must have
used and disclosed the trade secret. 46 The second and third ele-
ments outlined inJostens revolve around the misappropriation ele-
ment.47 According to the court, the misappropriation element
focuses on the breach of a confidential relationship, rather than
the existence of a trade secret. 48 The Jostens court stated that the
various elements "should not be artificially separated for purposes
of analysis since, in the significant sense, they are interde-
pendent. "
4 9
The issue of whether the defendants had acquired the trade se-
cret as a result of a confidential relationship was fundamental in
assigning liability. TheJostens court recognized that such a confi-
dential relationship may be imposed either contractually or by a
beginning employment with Jostens, and that they neither gained wages nor a promotion
as a result of their signing. Id at 703. The court held that the mere continuation of
employment was not sufficient consideration for the employment agreements. Id. at 703-
04; cf Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980) (non-
competition contract provided employee with real advantages).
43. 318 N.W.2d at 701. This three-prong test was first set out in Eutectic, 281 Minn. at
18, 160 N.W.2d at 570. See also 1 R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.07(1) (1967) (use or
disclosure must also cause detriment).
44. 318 N.W.2d at 698. The court recognized that the Cherne test has been given
statutory recognition under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Minnesota Statutes
§ 325C.01, subd. 5. d. at 698. The court also noted, however, that the statutory defini-
tion of trade secret apparently "does not require Cherne's third element, that the informa-
tion was gained at expense to the owner." Id. at 698 n.4.
45. Id. at 701.
46. I
47. Id
48. Id. The protection given to trade secrets does not aim to reward secret informa-
tion, but rather seeks to protect against breaches of faith and the use of improper methods
to obtain information. Id Trade secret law attempts to maintain standards of loyalty and
trust in the business community. Id,. see also R. MILGRIM, supra note 43, at § 12.01.
Injostens, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed several previous cases when it used
the three-part test for trade secret misappropriation. See 318 N.W.2d at 701; see also Eaton
Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Eutectic, 281 Minn.
at 18, 160 N.W.2d at 570. In Eaton, the court held that Minnesota law required a plaintiff
alleging a misappropriation cause of action to show: (1) the existence and ownership of a
trade secret; (2) the acquisition of the trade secret as a result of a confidential relationship;
and (3) the unauthorized use of the trade secret. Id at 1178.
49. 318 N.W.2d at 701 (citing R. MILGRIM, supra note 43, at § 7.07(1)). The issue
whether a confidential relationship exists involves consideration of the same factors as does
the issue whether a trade secret exists and whether the plaintiff has proved the fourth
Cherne element: the plaintiffis intent to keep the information confidential.
[Vol. I11
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss2/7
TRADE SECRETS
common law duty not to wrongfully use confidential informa-
tion.50 Since no valid confidentiality agreement existed, the court
focused on whether the defendants had breached their common
law duty to refrain from wrongfully using confidential information
obtained from their employer. 5' The court looked to the informa-
tion which the defendant acquired in his employment and deter-
mined whether that information was confidential. The test used
by the court was whether the information was such that "an em-
ployee knew or should have known [that it] was confidential. '52
The test applied inJostens is very similar to the fourth element in
the Cherne test for trade secret status.53 Applying this test to the
facts in Jostens, the court found that the information was not
confidential.
54
Although the Joslens court decided the confidentiality issue
based on common law duty instead of contractual duty,5 5 the
court discussed the possible effects of a valid confidentiality agree-
ment. 56 According to the court, even confidentiality agreements
50. Id. at 701, 703. One author has given some practical pointers regarding an em-
ployer's reliance on trade secret protection. Annot., 30 A.L.R.4th 1250 (1980). To get the
protection of the trade secret laws, an employer should design office procedures to protect
the confidentiality of the information. The employer should have employment contracts
for employees working in a confidential area which emphasize the secret nature of the
information. Id. at 1253-54.
51. 318 N.W.2d at 701-02.
52. Id at 702. This test requires that an employee receive adequate notice of the
secret nature of the information and which information is to remain confidential. Id; see
also R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS 79 (1953).
53. The fourth element of the Cherne test for trade secret status is whether the owner
or employer intended to keep the information confidential. Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 90.
54. 318 N.W.2d at 702. The court reached this holding after making the following
factual findings. First, Jostens did not really know what information it wanted to keep
secret. Id at 702. Second, some of the information was identical to information which
Jostens had treated as public. Id Third, Jostens had developed no policy of secrecy. Id
at 700. Fourth, Jostens was lax about protecting the information from disclosure to cus-
tomers. Id Fifth, Jostens approved publication of an article by the defendant explaining
the information. Id Sixth, none of the information was marked "confidential." Id. at
701. Finally, some of the employees working with the information were never asked to
sign confidentiality agreements even though Jostens had used such agreements elsewhere.
Id
55. Id at 703. The court held that the employment agreement lacked consideration,
since the defendants had signed the agreements after beginning their employment with
Jostens. The defendants had received no raises, promotions, or increased job security
which might have constituted valid consideration for the agreement. Id; see also Davies -
Daves Agency, 298 N.W.2d at 130 (holding that adequacy of consideration for non-compe-
tition agreement depends on facts of individual case). In Davies &Davies Agency, the court
noted that the contract provided the employee with tangible advantages. Id at 131.
56. 318 N.W.2d at 700. First, such agreements can help establish the existence of a
trade secret by proving an employer's attempt to keep the information secret. Second, the
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cannot keep an employee from taking his or her experience and
skills to another employer.5 7  The court concluded that Jostens'
employment agreement did not give the employee fair notice of
the confidential nature of the relationship and of what material
was to be kept confidential. 8
The question remains as to whether Jostens would have suc-
ceeded on a breach of contract claim had a valid employment
agreement existed. Two factors indicate that the existence of such
an agreement could have made the difference. First, in Cherne and
Kirkevold the court did not require that the plaintiffs prove that a
agreements can show the misappropriation element by evidencing a confidential relation-
ship between the employer and employee. Id
57. Id at 701-02. A confidentiality agreement will not protect the experience and
skills acquired by an employee to the extent that such skills are derived from generally
known sources. Id.
58. Id. at 701.
Joslens illustrates the impact of an employment agreement on the issue of whether a
trade secret exists. The court first analyzed plaintiffis claim that Jostens' computer graph-
ics subsystem constituted a trade secret. Id. at 698-701. Applying the Cheme four-part test,
the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the first and fourth requirements. Id.
The court discussed only the first and fourth Cheme requirements. Since the court found
that Jostens had failed to show that its computer system was not generally known and that
Jostens had not intended to keep the information secret, it did not discuss the second and
third Cheme requirements for trade secret status. Id at 700. The court's discussion of the
fourth requirement, the plaintiff/owners' intent to keep the information confidential, illus-
trates the potential importance of employment agreements in connection with this ele-
ment. Id
A plaintiff/employer can meet the fourth Cherne requirement only if it takes reason-
able steps to maintain the secrecy of the information. Id This requirement is now codi-
fied in Minnesota Statutes § 325C.01, subd. 5 (1982). Employees must understand that
the information is intended to remain "secret." Id TheJostens court cited decisions from
other jurisdictions holding that signed employment agreements fulfill an employer's duty
to apprise its employees of the confidential nature of the information. Id The court cited
Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F.
Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975), and Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618 (D.
Conn. 1976). Id In Structural Dynamics Research Corp., the plaintiff/employer emphasized
the confidential nature of the work in the individual confidential disclosure agreements
that each employee signed. 401 F. Supp. at 1112-14. In contrast, the court in Pressure
Science, Inc., found that the employer's failure to require all employees with access to alleg-
edly confidential information to sign a nondisclosure agreement demonstrated a lack of
concern for confidentiality. 413 F. Supp. at 627-28. The Jostens court also cited Kubik,
Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 358, 224 N.W.2d 80, 92 (1974), which held that employ-
ees must understand that information not readily available to the public is to be kept
confidential. 318 N.W.2d at 700.
Jostens' confidentiality agreement, however, did not sufficiently notify its employees
as to what information should remain secret. Id. at 702. The court found that the plaintiff
had not taken "reasonable steps" to guard against misappropriation of its alleged trade
secrets. Id at 701. This finding hinged in part on the fact that some of the employees
working with the computer system were never asked to sign a confidentiality agreement,
even though Jostens had required employees in other areas to sign such agreements. Id
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trade secret did indeed exist, only that a trade secret probabhl ex-
isted.59 Thus, with a valid agreement Jostens may have been able
to ease its burden of proving all four Cherne elements. The court
did not rule out a finding that, had there been consideration, the
employees might have breached the employment agreement even
though they had not committed any trade secret misappropria-
tion. An enforceable employment agreement may protect certain
information that would not be protected under the law of trade
secret misappropriation.
Second, even if a confidential agreement is not supported by
consideration, the agreement still may help to establish either the
secrecy element of trade secret status or the common law duty of
confidentiality. After jostens, both these elements require that an
employee have fair notice of the confidentiality. An agreement
could, therefore, provide such notice even though the agreement is
unenforceable for lack of consideration. The courts have never
ruled out this possibility.
III. THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT IN MINNESOTA
A. The Uniform Act
Minnesota was the first state to enact the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.6° Minnesota's version is essentially identical to the
Uniform Act. 61 The Uniform Act was drafted and adopted to ad-
dress the increasing reliance on trade secret protection despite the
doubtful and confusing status of both the common law and statu-
tory remedies for trade secret misappropriation. 62 The Uniform
59. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
60. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1982). Minnesota enacted its version of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act in 1980. Act of Apr. 23, 1980, ch. 594, §§ 3-12, 1980 Minn. Laws
1103. The Act became effective in Minnesota on August 1, 1980. Electro-Craft, 332
N.W.2d at 897 n.3. At the time Electro-Craft was decided, only Minnesota and Louisiana
had adopted the Uniform Act. Id See generally Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64
MARQ. L. REV. 277 (1980).
61. Minnesota's Act differs slightly from the Uniform Act in dealing with injunctive
relief. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325C.02(b) (future use of trade secret is conditional upon
payment of a royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could have been prohib-
ited by employment contract or upon payment of other compensation) with UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (future use of trade secret is conditional upon payment of a royalty
for no longer than the period of time the use could have been prohibited by employment
contract). The two acts also differ with respect to the amount of punitive damages recov-
ery. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325C.03(b) (the court may determine the amount of punitive
damages) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 3(b) (the punitive damages award may not
exceed twice any award made under § 3(a)).
62. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, supra note 15, at 537. The Uniform Act was ap-
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Act codified the basic principles of common law trade secret pro-
tection.63 The Act imposes liability only if a trade secret exists and
the defendant's acquisition or disclosure of that trade secret is im-
proper.64 According to the drafters, a significant contribution of
the Act was the creation of "a single statute of limitations for the
various property, quasi-contractual, and violation of fiduciary re-
lationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at common
law."'65 The Uniform Act also contains a comprehensive definition
of a "trade secret":
66
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not be-
ing generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy. 6
7
In addition, the Uniform Act provides for an array of relief, in-
cluding money damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages,6 and
attorneys' fees in certain cases. 69 It displaces all other conflicting
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979. It
allows the protection of certain types of information through an action for misappropria-
tion. Id.
63. Id at 538. "Under both the [Uniform] Act and common law principles, for exam-
ple, more than one person can be entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the
same information .. " Id at 538. One of the broadly stated policies behind trade secret
law is the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
64. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, supra note 15, at 538; see MINN. STAT. § 325C.01.
These two elements were contained in the three-part test of Euteci'c and Jostens.
65. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, supra note 15, at 538. The three-year limitation
period is contained in Minnesota Statutes § 325C.06.
66. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). The Act's definition of trade secret departs
slightly from the first Restatement of Torts definition which required that the trade secret
be continuously used in one's business. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). The Uni-
form Act's broader definition extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet used the
trade secret. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, Commissioners' Comment, 14 U.L.A. 543
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Commissioners' Comment].
67. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
68. Id §§ 2, 3. The corresponding sections in the Minnesota Act are found in Minne-
sota Statutes §§ 325C.02-.03. For a general discussion of damages, see Annot., 11
A.L.R.4th 13 (1982).
69. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4. Minnesota Statutes § 325C.04 provides: "[I]f (i)
a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction
is made or resisted in bad faith, or (iii) willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party." MINN. STAT.
§ 325C.04.
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laws of the enacting state pertaining to civil liability for misappro-
priation of a trade secret. 70
B. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc.
Like Jostens, Electro-Crafi Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc.7t involved
a cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.7 2 Electro-Craft
Corporation (ECC) sought injunctive relief against Controlled
Motion, Incorporated (CMI) and ECC's former sales manager for
misappropriation of trade secrets relating to designs on electric
motors. 73  ECC's former employee had signed an employment
agreement when hired by ECC.74 This agreement included a con-
70. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 7; see also MINN. STAT. § 325C.07.
71. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
72. The court inquired whether or not a trade secret existed and was not concerned
with whether or not Electro-Craft Corporation (ECC) had a legitimate business interest in
a restrictive employment agreement. Indeed, the absence of a restrictive employment
agreement probably forced ECC to sue in tort rather than for breach of contract. In fact,
the Eleclro-Cray/ court recognized the difference between trade secret law and non-competi-
tion agreements. The latter, according to the court, can protect information and depends
only on a single act by the employer. Trade secret protection, however, depends "upon a
continuing course of conduct by the employer, a course of conduct which creates a confi-
dential relationship." Id. at 901.
Eectro-Cra? reinforces Jostens by indicating that a cause of action for trade secret mis-
appropriation is a more tenuous way than a non-competition agreement for employers to
protect against the disclosure of confidential information. See supra notes 35-38 and ac-
companying text (citing cases holding that an employer does not need to strictly prove the
existence of a trade secret before obtaining an injunction against the former employee
from violating an employment agreement).
73. 332 N.W.2d at 893. ECC manufactured "D.C. iron core motors, moving coil mo-
tors, brushless motors, and other products." Id. Controlled Motion, Incorporated (CMI)
manufactured moving coil motors and was founded by a former national sales manager
for ECC, John Mahoney, also a defendant in ECC's suit. Mahoney had established ECC's
customer relationships for the motors. After Mahoney left ECC and began working for
CMI, ECC brought suit against Mahoney and CMI, alleging that Mahoney had misap-
propriated ECC's trade secrets. Id at 893-96.
74. Id at 895. The confidentiality agreements were contained in the employment
agreements and read as follows:
Employees shall not directly or indirectly disclose or use at any time, either dur-
ing or subsequent to the said employment, any secret or confidential informa-
tion, knowledge, or data of Employer (whether or not obtained, acquired or
developed by Employee) unless he shall first secure the written consent of Em-
ployer. Upon termination of his employment Employee shall turn over to Em-
ployer all notes, memoranda, notebooks, drawings or other documents made,
compiled by or delivered to him concerning any product, apparatus or process
manufactured, used or developed or investigated by Employer during the period
of his employment; it being agreed that the same and all information contained
therein are at all times the property of the Employer.
Id. at 895 n.I.
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fidentiality provision but not a non-competition agreement. 75 The
trial court granted a temporary injunction, finding that CMI and
ECC's former employee had misappropriated ECC's trade secrets
regarding the electric motor.76 The supreme court reversed.
The court held that the existence of a signed confidentiality
agreement was not enough to establish a cause of action for trade
secret misapproriation. 77 Electro-Craft provided the Minnesota
Supreme Court with its first opportunity to interpret the Uniform
Act. 78 Therefore, the case sheds light on the connection between
the earlier common law of trade secrets and the current law under
the Act. Electro-Craft also contains important implications for the
role of employment agreements in trade secret litigation.
The Electro-Craft court used a two-prong test for determining
whether the plaintiffs had established a claim for trade secret mis-
appropriation. 79 The court stated that the plaintiff must first
75. Id at 895; see supra note 74 for the text of the confidentiality agreement.
Confidentiality agreements seem to have less weight in favor of trade secret status
than non-competition agreements, but the former can be bolstered by specific notifications
of information which the employer seeks to keep confidential. See 332 N.W.2d at 903.
The Electro-Craft court defined "confidentiality" as "the procedures by which the employer
signals to its employees and to others that certain information is secret and should not be
disclosed." Id.
Additionally, for the confidentiality agreement to support a misappropriation cause
of action it must be accompanied by other reasonable actions of the employer geared to
maintain secrecy. Id. Based on the following findings, the court held that Electro-Craft
did not make reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy: (1) Electro-Craft did not limit em-
ployee or customer access to certain parts of the plant; (2) documents were not kept in a
central or locked location; (3) discarded documents were not destroyed; (4) the public was
often invited on informal tours and "open houses" at the plant; and (5) the exit interviews
of departing employees did not constitute reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. Id at
902-03.
The court also recognized that an employer could protect information more effec-
tively through employment contracts containing a non-competition clause. Such a con-
tract requires only a single act by the employer. Id at 901. Compare this with an
employer's duties under trade secret law. To obtain trade secret protection, the employer
must maintain a "continuing course of conduct . . . which creates a confidential relation-
ship." Id
76. Id at 896. The trial court found that the defendant had misappropriated ECC's
trade secrets and enjoined defendants from producing or selling any electric motors which
resembled ECC's motors. Id.
77. Id at 903. The court held that the employee agreements did not support their
claim because ECC never treated the information as secret. Id
78. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08; see 332 N.W.2d at 898. The court stated that the
Act "carries forward, explains, and clarifies many of the rules of the common law of trade
secrets." Where the Act modifies the common law, however, the statutory language con-
trols. Id
79. 332 N.W.2d at 897. The court required the plaintiff to prove the existence of a
trade secret and the misappropriation of that trade secret. Id This holding reflected the
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prove the existence of a trade secret and second, must prove that
the trade secret was misappropriated.80
In addressing the issue of whether ECC had proved the first ele-
ment of its cause of action for misappropriation-the existence of a
trade secret-the court turned to the Uniform Act.81 Electro-Craft
recognizes three elements for proving trade secret status under the
Act. First, the information must not be generally known or readily
ascertainable.82 Second, the employer must gain independent eco-
nomic value from the secret information.83 Third, the employer
must have expended reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.84 The
court discussed each of these statutory elements in determining
whether ECC had proven the existence of a trade secret.8 5 The
requirements of Minnesota's Uniform Trade Secret Act, MINN. STAT. § 325C.01. For lia-
bility to exist under the Act, a trade secret must exist and a person's acquisition, use, or
disclosure of that trade secret must be improper. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, supra
note 15, at 538.
80. 332 N.W.2d at 897. These elements were based not only on prior case law but
also on the language of the Act. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act only protects certain
types of information (trade secrets) through an action for misappropriation. Misappropri-
ation is then defined as the improper acquisition, disclosure, or use of a "trade secret."
MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 3.
81. 332 N.W.2d at 898. The Act has, in part, embodied the test for trade secret status
used in both Cherne and Jostens. Id. at 899. The court also stated that the Act carries
forward and clarifies the common law of trade secrets. Id at 898; see also Commissioner's
Prefatory Note, supra note 15, at 538. The court warned, however, that where the Act
modifies the common law, courts will look to the statutory language. 332 N.W.2d at 898.
The Uniform Act's definition has modified the Cherne and Jostens trade secret status
test in two ways. First, it has significantly reduced the third Cherne element. The court
noted that the third common law element of trade secret status was not completely elimi-
nated by the Act, as had been suggested in Jostens. Id; see 318 N.W.2d at 698 n.4. Under
the Act the issue is whether information that is gained at the owner's expense provides a
competitive advantage in the marketplace. 332 N.W.2d at 901 n.12. The third common
law element of trade secret status, information developed at plaintiff's expense, "becomes
a possible element of proof that the information provides a competitive advantage." Id.
Second, the fourth element of the Cherne test, the employer's intent to keep the infor-
mation confidential, is no longer dispositive. After Electro-Craft, the employer is required
to take reasonable, affirmative steps to insure that the information remain secret. Id at
901. The Cherne court said that the fourth element of trade secret status was that the
owner intended to keep the information secret. 278 N.W.2d at 90. The Electro-Craft court
rejected the trial court's finding that a mere intention to keep the information secret was
sufficient under either the Act or the common law. 332 N.W.2d at 901. According to the
court, even the common law required more than an intention; instead, the plaintiff was
required to show that "it had manifested that intention by making some effort to keep the
information secret." Id The court also quoted the Act's requirements that the owner
make "reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy." Id
82. 332 N.W.2d at 899; see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
83. 332 N.W.2d at 900; see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
84. 332 N.W.2d at 901; see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
85. 332 N.W.2d at 899.
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court's analysis of these elements also reflects the impact that em-
ployment agreements may have on the issue of trade secret status.
According to the court, the first statutory element of trade secret
status is whether the information is not generally known or readily
ascertainable. The court upheld the lower court's finding that the
exact combination of features of ECC's electric motor was unique
and, hence, "not generally known. '8 6 The court characterized the
particular combination of features of the motor as a unique solu-
tion to the needs of one customer in the industry even though none
of the individual features were unique .
7
86. Id. at 900. The supreme court stated that the trier of fact should have discretion
in determining whether information is generally known or ascertainable. Any resulting
danger to legitimate competition, however, will be mitigated by the following factors: (1)
plaintiff's burden of proof on the elements of trade secret status; (2) plaintiff's inability to
protect information with respect to which plaintiff did not make reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy; and (3) the courts' duty to fashion a remedy which will balance employ-
ers' rights to protect secrets with employees' rights to compete using "state of the art"
knowledge. Id. at 900 n. II (citing E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108,
1112-13 (8th Cir. 1969)).
87. 332 N.W.2d at 899. The trial court had found that the exact combination of
features of the electric motor was unique, even though none of the processes or features are
unique in the industry and even though the electric motor is not the only way to achieve
the required performance. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld this ruling and
found that the exact combination of features constituted a unique solution to the needs of
one customer in the industry. Id. The court recognized that novelty is not required for
trade secrets to the same extent as for patentability. Id Nevertheless, the court said that
its decision did not suggest that ECC could claim trade secret status for the entire class of
its moving coil motors. Id at 900. ECC could not object if a new customer devised an
application for ECC's motor and CMI modified its motor to meet those new specifications.
Id In that instance, ECC would be attempting to protect a design process of trial and
error by which the features of its motor are adapted to a given use, not a specific combina-
tion of features. Id According to the court, trade secret law will not protect talent or
expertise. Id
The Electro-Crafi court also indicated that the uniqueness issue might have turned out
differently had a non-competition agreement existed. The court recognized that, by al-
lowing possible trade secret protection for the electric motor, it risked stifling the ability of
employees to "compete with their former employers (in the absence of a valid non-compe-
tition agreement) using 'state of the art' knowledge." Id at 900 n. 11. This risk to legiti-
mate competition would be mitigated, however, by the employer's burden of proof on the
elements of trade secret status under the Act and the employer's inability to protect infor-
mation that it had not reasonably maintained as "secret" during defendant's employment.
Id. Furthermore, the court recognized that an employer's burden of proof in a cause of
action for trade secret misappropriation is higher than its burden of proving the reasona-
bleness of a non-competition agreement protecting the employer's trade secrets. On the
other hand, the Eleciro-Craft court also indicated ways in which even a valid employment
agreement may not benefit an employer in its action for trade secret misappropriation.
The court stated that the law of trade secrets will only protect secret information. Id at
900. Consequently, even though an employee may breach an employment agreement,
that employee may not be liable for trade secret misappropriation if he merely used his or
her talent or expertise for another employer. See Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp.,
[Vol. I I
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The second statutory element for trade secret status, the realiza-
tion of independent economic value because of secrecy, codifies the
common law requirement of competitive advantage."" This ele-
ment does not require that the owner of the trade secret be the
only one in the market.89 The Electro-Craft court denied ECC's
claim that certain information yields independent economic value
from secrecy solely because the employer spent money developing
that information 0 The Electro-Craft court explained that the in-
dependent economic value must arise from information which, if
obtained by an outsider, would yield a valuable share of the mar-
ket to that outsider.9 1 According to the court, the expense factor
supports a finding of competitive advantage only if, under the
present state of the art, "a prospective competitor could not pro-
duce a comparable motor without a similar expenditure of time
and money."
'92
The court held that ECC's motor did provide the plaintiff with
economic value from its secrecy. 93 The court reasoned that the
value of the information was such that ECC would lose if any pro-
spective competitor could enter the market without a substantial
developmental expense, thus cutting into ECC's market share.94
This holding seems to establish two components of the economic
value element of a trade secret: (1) an employer must show a
causal link between the secrecy of the information and the em-
ployer's market share, and (2) the secret information must be of a
nature that a competitor could obtain it only at great expense.
Employment agreements have their greatest effect on the third
statutory element of trade secret status, the proof of an employer's
526 F. Supp. 1172 (ND. Ind. 1981). According to the court, "It is well settled that an
employee, upon leaving his employment, may take with him and utilize the skill and
general knowledge obtained by him during his employment." Id at 1180. The employee,
however, may still be liable for breach of a non-competition agreement.
88. 332 N.W.2d at 900.
89. Id The court denied CMI's argument that ECC was required to show a competi-
tive advantage over all competitors. Id. The court specifically stated that several develop-
ers of the information may have trade secret rights in that information. Id; see also
Commissioners' Comment, supra note 66, at 542-43.
90. 332 N.W.2d at 901.
91. Id. at 900.
92. Id at 901.
93. Id. The court's holding was supported by the trial court's finding that an expen-
diture of time and money similar to that expended by ECC would be required of a pro-
spective competitor now. Id
94. Id
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reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.9 5  It is this element on
which the plaintiffs claim in Electro-Craft failed, even though a
signed confidentiality agreement existed.9 6 To obtain trade secret
status for certain information, an employer must notify the em-
ployee of the secrecy of the information and must also treat the
information as if it were secret.97 The court held that ECC had
not taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the infor-
mation.98 Moreover, the court's explanation emphasized that
trade secret protection depends upon a continuing course of con-
duct by the employer which creates a confidential relationship. 99
The court noted that ECC's confidentiality procedures were lax
and that employee mobility within the industry was common.'0°
The court also noted that ECC had not marked any of the docu-
ments as "confidential," that employees had easy access to the doc-
uments, and that the confidentiality agreements were too vague.' 0 '
The third statutory element of trade secret status is closely re-
lated to the second prong of a cause of action for trade secret mis-
95. The Act requires an employer to make reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy
of the information. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 5(ii). A mere intention to keep the
information secret is insufficient. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 901. This requirement pre-
cludes employee liability unless the employer can prove that its treatment of the informa-
tion "has been adequate to indicate a breach of the confidential relationship." Sloan,
Trade Secrets. Real Toads in a Conceptual Garden, I W. ST. L. REv. 113, 145 (1973).
96. 332 N.W.2d at 903. ECC had met its burden of proof on the first two statutory
elements. A trade secret exists, however, only when a plaintiff proves all three of the
elements. Id
97. Id. at 901-03. The court stated that "the employer cannot complain of the em-
ployee's use of information if the employer has never treated the information as secret."
Id The efforts required to maintain secrecy must be "reasonable under the circum-
stances." Commissioners' Comment, supra note 66, at 543. This element of trade secret
law "does not require maintenance of absolute secrecy .... ." 332 N.W.2d at 901.
98. 332 N.W.2d at 901. The court so held even while acknowledging that ECC took
minimal precautions in screening its publications for confidential information and in re-
quiring some of its employees to sign confidentiality agreements. Id. at 901-02. According
to the court, these precautions were not enough. Id. at 902.
The court made this determination despite a specific finding by the trial court that
ECC had met the fourth element of intent in the Cherne test. Id. at 901. The intention
language used by the trial court, however, came from the common law test for trade secret
status as established in Cherne. Id The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that even the
common law required more than an intention. Id
99. Id at 901. The court stated that this requirement sets trade secret law apart from
the other two methods by which employers can protect information-patents and non-
competition agreements. Id While these two remedies depend only on a single act by the
employer, trade secret protection depends on a "continuing course of conduct which cre-
ates a confidential relationship." Id
100. Id at 902.
101. Id at 903. The court found that "the confidentiality agreements signed by the
employees were too vague to apprise the employees of specific 'secrets.' " Id
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appropriation: an actual misappropriation.10 2  The Elec/ro-Crafi
court held that since no trade secret existed, it did not need to
address the issue of whether a misappropriation had occurred. 103
Nevertheless, it discussed the misappropriation element after not-
ing that the concepts of trade secret status and misappropriation
should not be artificially separated. 0 4 Citing the Uniform Act's
definition of misappropriation,05 the court stated that ECC was
required to show some duty on the part of its employee not to
disclose the information.t06 ECC claimed that the employee's
duty arose from the employment agreement and from a confiden-
tial employer-employee relationship.10 7 Citing Jostens, the court
stated that a common law duty of confidentiality arises only as to
information which the employer has treated as secret and has so
notified the employees.' 08 The Electro-Craft court found that
ECC's failure to make reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy was
102. See id.; see alsoJostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701. Both trade secret status and the misap-
propriation element depend on the existence of a confidential relationship. See 1d. at 698,
701. The Act defines misappropriation as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason
to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied con-
sent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means
to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.
MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 3. Improper means could also include otherwise lawful
conduct which is improper under the circumstances. Commissioners' Comment, supra
note 66, at 542.
103. 332 N.W.2d at 903.
104. Id Because the concepts of trade secret status and misappropriation are so closely
interrelated, the court felt "compelled to discuss the tort of misappropriation." Id.," see also
Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701 (misappropriation and trade secret approaches overlap).
105. 332 N.W.2d at 903. According to Minnesota Statutes § 325C.01, subd. 3, misap-
propriation involves the acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret through improper
means. MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 3. In addition, Minnesota Statutes § 325C.01,
subd. 2, defines improper means as: "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or induce-
ment of breach of a duty to maintain secrecy or espionage through electronic or other
means." Id, subd. 2.
106. 332 N.W.2d at 903.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Jostens court held that "the employee is entitled to fair notice of the confi-
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fatal to its claim that a confidential relationship existed.' 0 9 The
employee had never been put on notice of a duty of confidential-
ity, so a trade secret could not have been misappropriated." 0
Essentially, the Electro-Craft court incorporated the last two ele-
ments of thejostens test as its standard to prove the misappropria-
tion element." ' I The misappropriation element depends largely on
whether a confidential relationship was established." 2 The estab-
lishment of such relationship in turn depends on whether the em-
ployee was notified of such a confidential relationship and of the
confidentiality of the information." 3 Thus, the same considera-
tion seems to apply to establishing misappropriation as to estab-
lishing the existence of a trade secret: namely, whether the
employer has taken reasonable steps to maintain secrecy."
4
Electro-Craft did not specifically overrule the three-part Jostens
test and it did not eliminate the confidentiality element of a trade
secret misappropriation cause of action." 5 The Electro-Craft test
differs somewhat from the test used in jostens, however." 6 The
court's implication is that the Electro-Craft test actually encom-
passes the three-part test of Jostens. Instead of emphasizing confi-
dentiality as a separate element of a misappropriation cause of
action as the court did in jostens, the Electro-Craft court simply in-
corporated that element into the other two elements." 7 Under
dential nature of the relationship and what material is to be kept confidential." 318
N.W.2d at 702.
109. 332 N.W.2d at 903.
110. Id The court held that the vague language in the employment agreements did
not create a duty of confidentiality. Id.
111. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
112. See lostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701. The Electro-Cra? court stated that in the employer-
employee context of that case, EGG had to show "some duty on the part of the employee
not to disclose the information." Electro-Crafl, 332 N.W.2d at 903.
113. 332 N.W.2d at 903. A common law duty of confidentiality arises only as to infor-
mation which the employer has treated as secret. Id
114. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
115. The Eutectic test was applied by the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota one month before Electro-Craft was decided. In Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fabcon,
Inc., 570 F. Supp. 81 (D. Minn. 1983), the court, citingjostens, held that a plaintiff assert-
ing a claim of trade secret misappropriation must prove: (1) the existence of a trade secret;
(2) that it was acquired as a result of a confidential relationship; and (3) that the defend-
ant has used and disclosed the trade secret. Id at 87.
116. 318 N.W.2d at 701. TheJostens court used the Eutectic three-element test for trade
secret misappropriation. Id. In an action for trade secret misappropriation, the Eulectic
court required proof of the following elements: (1) a trade secret; (2) that the trade secret
had been acquired by defendant as a result of a confidential relationship; and (3) that
defendant had used and disclosed the trade secret. 160 N.W.2d at 570.
117. 332 N.W.2d at 897. The court recognized that a confidential relationship is a
[Vol. I11
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Electro-Crafi, the confidentiality of the relationship is now an ele-
ment of proof in both the trade secret and misappropriation ele-
ments of a cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.
Therefore, although at first glance Elec/ro-Craft apparently modi-
fied the test for trade secret misappropriation, this modification is
only illusory.
The Electro-Craft court also stated that the employment agree-
ment had not helped the plaintiff's claim because the agreement
was too vague and because the plaintiff had never treated specific
information as secret." 8 Therefore, if the confidentiality agree-
ment had been more specific in Electro-Cra?, the court may have
found that a trade secret existed and that a misappropriation had
occurred. By requiring strict proof of both the existence and mis-
appropriation of a trade secret, Electro-Craft reaffirmed the theory
that plaintiffs asserting a cause of action for trade secret misappro-
priation have a higher burden of proof than plaintiffs seeking to
protect information through an action for breach of a non-compe-
tition agreement." 9 As discussed earlier, "confidential business in-
formation which does not rise to the level of a trade secret can be
protected by a properly drawn covenant not to compete."'' 20 In
essence, Electro-Craft held that the existence of a valid employment
agreement may not only change the cause of action that an em-.
ployer may sue upon, but may also change the amount of proof"
that the employer must offer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Electro-Craft indi-
cates that the Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not significantly
vary the former case law on trade secrets. The decision does re-
flect, however, an important counterpoint to earlier case law
which was somewhat deferential to employment agreements
geared to protect trade secrets. The court's denial of the em-
ployer's misappropriation claim in Electro-Craft indicates that non-
prerequisite to an action for misappropriation and that the elements of trade secret status
and the confidentiality of the relationship are largely interdependent. Id The Electro-Craj/
court rejected the notion that only a breach of a confidential relationship is required for a
defendant to be liable for trade secret misappropriation. Id at 897 n.5.
118. Id. at 903.
119. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
120. 578 F.2d at 1268 (citing Walker Employment Serv., Inc. v. Park-Hurst, 300 Minn.
264, 219 N.W.2d 437 (1974); Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134
N.W.2d 892 (1965)).
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competition agreements constitute an employer's surest and most
effective tool for protecting trade secrets. Employment agreements
require only a single act by the employer: making the contract.
Trade secret protection demands a continuous course of conduct
by the employer. In addition, while the employment agreement is
necessary for the protection of the employer's trade secrets, the
burden of proving the reasonableness of the agreement is far easier
than the burden of proving the existence of a trade secret in a
cause of action for misappropriation.
The existence of a valid employment agreement will enable the
employer to sue for a breach of that agreement. Such an agree-
ment, even if invalid, can also help establish an employer's cause
of action for trade secret misappropriation. The existence of an
agreement constitutes evidence that the information is a trade se-
cret and that a confidential relationship has been created. There-
fore, in light of Eleciro-Craft, an employer's best course of action is
to require its employees to sign a non-competition agreement.
That agreement will undoubtedly prove invaluable whether the
employer sues on a breach of contract or on a misappropriation
theory.
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